Talos Linux supports disk encryption for system volumes, and for user volumes. System volumes include the STATE and EPHEMERAL partitions:
  • STATE contains the most sensitive node data: secrets and certs.
  • EPHEMERAL may contain sensitive workload data.
Data is encrypted using LUKS2, which is provided by the Linux kernel modules and cryptsetup utility. The operating system will run additional setup steps when encryption is enabled. If the disk encryption is enabled for the STATE partition, the system will:
  • Save STATE encryption config as JSON in the META partition.
  • Before mounting the STATE partition, load encryption configs either from the machine config or from the META partition. Note that the machine config is always preferred over the META one.
  • Before mounting the STATE partition, format and encrypt it. This occurs only if the STATE partition is empty and has no filesystem.
If the disk encryption is enabled for the EPHEMERAL partition, the system will:
  • Get the encryption config from the machine config.
  • Before mounting the EPHEMERAL partition, encrypt and format it. This occurs only if the EPHEMERAL partition is empty and has no filesystem.
Talos Linux supports four encryption methods, which can be combined together for a single partition:
  • static - encrypt with the static passphrase (weakest protection, for STATE partition encryption it means that the passphrase will be stored in the META partition).
  • nodeID - encrypt with the key derived from the node UUID (weak, it is designed to protect against data being leaked or recovered from a drive that has been removed from a Talos Linux node).
  • kms - encrypt using key sealed with network KMS (strong, but requires network access to decrypt the data.)
  • tpm - encrypt with the key derived from the TPM (strong, when used with SecureBoot).
Note: nodeID encryption is not designed to protect against attacks where physical access to the machine, including the drive, is available. It uses the hardware characteristics of the machine in order to decrypt the data, so drives that have been removed, or recycled from a cloud environment or attached to a different virtual machine, will maintain their protection and encryption. Note: When using KMS encryption for STATE partition the network configuration can’t be provided via the machine configuration, as KMS requires network connectivity before STATE partition is unlocked. Also custom CA certificates cannot be used for the KMS server, as these are stored in the STATE partition as well.

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Configuration

Disk encryption is disabled by default. For system volumes, disk encryption is configured with the VolumeConfig machine configuration document, while for user volumes it is configured with the UserVolumeConfig document. To enable disk encryption you should patch the machine configuration, for example for the STATE and EPHEMERAL partitions using nodeID encryption: 
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: STATE
encryption:
  provider: luks2
  keys:
    - nodeID: {}
      slot: 0
---
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: EPHEMERAL
encryption:
  provider: luks2
  keys:
    - nodeID: {}
      slot: 0
For user volumes, the configuration is similar, but you should use the UserVolumeConfig kind: 
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: UserVolumeConfig
name: my-user-volume
encryption:
  provider: luks2
  keys:
    - nodeID: {}
      slot: 0

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Encryption Keys

Note: What the LUKS2 docs call “keys” are, in reality, a passphrase. When this passphrase is added, LUKS2 runs argon2 to create an actual key from that passphrase.
LUKS2 supports up to 32 encryption keys and it is possible to specify all of them in the machine configuration. Talos always tries to sync the keys list defined in the machine config with the actual keys defined for the LUKS2 partition. So if you update the keys list, keep at least one key that is not changed to be used for key management. When you define a key you should specify the key kind and the slot: 
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: STATE
encryption:
  keys:
    - nodeID: {} # key kind
      slot: 1
---
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: EPHEMERAL
encryption:
  keys:
    - static:
        passphrase: supersecret
      slot: 0
      lockToSTATE: true
Take a note that key order does not play any role on which key slot is used. Every key must always have a slot defined.

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Encryption Key Kinds

Talos supports two kinds of keys:
  • nodeID which is generated using the node UUID and the partition label (note that if the node UUID is not really random it will fail the entropy check).
  • static which you define right in the configuration.
  • kms which is sealed with the network KMS.
  • tpm which is sealed using the TPM and protected with SecureBoot.
Note: The STATE volume encryption configuration will be stored cleartext in META volume, so it is not secure to use static keys for STATE volume. Other volumes can use static keys as long as STATE partition itself is encrypted.
Every key kind also supports lockToSTATE option, which means that the key will be locked to the contents of the STATE partition:
  • if the STATE partition is wiped/replaced with new contents, locked to STATE volumes will not be unlockable anymore.
  • Talos Linux generates a random salt, and stores in the STATE partition, which will be mixed into the key derivation function.
It is recommended to use lockToSTATE for the EPHEMERAL partition and user volumes, so that the data on these partitions is not accessible if the STATE partition is wiped or replaced. If you would like non-STATE volumes to survive STATE partition wipe, do not enable lockToSTATE option.

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Key Rotation

In order to completely rotate keys, it is necessary to do talosctl apply-config a couple of times, since there is a need to always maintain a single working key while changing the other keys around it. Key rotation can only be handled after a reboot, so the system can re-encrypt the partitions with the new keys, and some encryption types (TPM) can only be used after the initial boot. So, for example, first add a new key: 
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: EPHEMERAL
encryption:
  keys:
    - static:
        passphrase: oldkey
      slot: 0
    - static:
        passphrase: newkey
      slot: 1
Run: 
talosctl apply-config -n <node> --mode=reboot -f config.yaml
Then remove the old key: 
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: EPHEMERAL
encryption:
  keys:
    - static:
        passphrase: newkey
      slot: 1
Run: 
talosctl apply-config -n <node> --mode=reboot -f config.yaml

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Going from Unencrypted to Encrypted and Vice Versa

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Ephemeral Partition

There is no in-place encryption support for the partitions right now, so to avoid losing data only empty partitions can be encrypted. As such, migration from unencrypted to encrypted needs some additional handling, especially around explicitly wiping partitions.
  • apply-config should be called with --mode=staged.
  • Partition should be wiped after apply-config, but before the reboot.
Edit your machine config and add the encryption configuration: 
vim config.yaml
Apply the configuration with --mode=staged: 
talosctl apply-config -f config.yaml -n <node ip> --mode=staged
Wipe the partition you’re going to encrypt: 
talosctl reset --system-labels-to-wipe EPHEMERAL -n <node ip> --reboot=true
That’s it! After you run the last command, the partition will be wiped and the node will reboot. During the next boot the system will encrypt the partition.

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State Partition

Calling wipe against the STATE partition will make the node lose the config, so the previous flow is not going to work. The flow should be to first wipe the STATE partition: 
talosctl reset  --system-labels-to-wipe STATE -n <node ip> --reboot=true
Node will enter into maintenance mode, then run apply-config with --insecure flag: 
talosctl apply-config --insecure -n <node ip> -f config.yaml
After installation is complete the node should encrypt the STATE partition.